2019 LLR 279

DELHI HIGH COURT

Hon’ble Ms. Rekha Patil, J.

W.P. (C) No. 5658/2011, Dt/–8-1-2019

Delhi Transport Corporation

vs.

Raj Singh

ENQUIRY – When liable to be vitiated – Bus Conductor was issued chargesheet for inflicting blows on the forehead of Deputy Manager for not assigning him duty inside the depot – He replied that entire case is false and fabricated against him – He remained hospitalized in R.M.L. Hospital and

on the date of incident he was hospitalized in Popli Nursing Home – Before Enquiry Officer he submitted medical documents – On his request Enquiry Officer sent a letter to Doctor of Popli Nursing for recording his evidence but the Doctor replied that he may be contacted over phone since he has to attend his clinic in Najafgarh confirming genuineness of the medical certificate Enquiry Officer held the charges proved against the workman – On the basis of enquiry finding, the workman was removed from his services – He raised an industrial dispute – Labour Court set aside the order of termination of the workman observing that Management has not been able to prove the charges – Management challenged the award in writ petition – Held, it is wrong that the Enquiry Officer did not grant adequate opportunity to produce defence witness – Enquiry Officer did not consider Medical certificate properly – Even letter sent by the Doctor of the Hospital has not been considered – Such enquiry finding is perverse being in violation of principles of natural justice – Management did not make effort to prove the charges before the Labour Court – Hence, subsequent proceedings are without any force to justify termination of services – Hence, writ petition dismissed.

Paras 19 to 21

 

COMPENSATION – In lieu of reinstatement – Justification – Workman has already attained the age of superannuation – Labour Court awarded lumpsum compensation of Rs. 2.00 lacs and gratuity to the workman – Management challenged the award in writ petition – Held, as the enquiry finding is in violation of principles of natural justice, the workman is entitled to reinstatement with back-wages – However, keeping in view the fact that the workman has attained the age of superannuation, compensation granted in lieu of reinstatement is justified.

Para 7 and 25

 

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA – Article 226 or 227 – Powers of superintendence under writ jurisdiction have to be exercised only sparingly to ensure that the subordinate courts do not exceed their own jurisdiction and exercise it as and when required or when there has been a manifest failure of justice and not in routine. Para 26

For Petitioner: Mr. U.N. Tiwary, Advocate.

For Respondent: Mr. Anil Mittal, Advocate with Ms. Komal Aggarwal, Advocate.

IMPORTANT POINTS

• An enquiry is liable to be vitiated if it is found in violation of principles of natural justice.

 

• Non-consideration, of medical documents or letter confirming the genuineness of those documents by the Enquiry Officer is violation of principles of natural justice.

 

• When the Labour Court helds the enquiry not fair and proper, the Management may seek opportunity to prove the charges before the Labour Court by conducting afresh enquiry by the Labour Court.

 

• When the workman has already attained the age of superannuation, his reinstatement is not possible, hence awarding lumpsum compensation to the workman is justified.

 

• Powers of superintendence under writ jurisdiction e. under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India have to be exercised by the Writ Court only sparingly to ensure that the subordinate courts do not exceed their own jurisdiction and exercise it as and when required or when there has been a manifest failure of justice and not as a routine.

JUDGMENT

PER REKHA PALLI, J—1. Vide the present petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner/Delhi Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as “Corporation”) seeks quashing of the Award dated 1st July, 2010 passed by the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Karkardooma Courts, Delhi in ID No.208/08/96, whereunder the respondent’s removal from service was held to be unjustified and the petitioner was directed to pay him Rs. 2,00,00 as lump sum compensation towards back-wages along with gratuity.

 

2. The facts necessary for the adjudication of the present petition as emerging from the record, may be noted at the outset. The respondent was appointed as a bus Conductor in the petitioner/Corporation on 20th May, 1977 and was posted at Hari Nagar Bus Depot II on the relevant date, i.e., 4^th September, 1992, when he allegedly entered the room of Shri Chaman Lal, Deputy Manager (Traffic) at about 11.15 a.m. or 11.20 a.m. It is the petitioner’s case that the respondent had not only asked the aforesaid Deputy Manager to assign him duties inside the depot but had also physically assaulted him by inflicting blows on his forehead and left shoulder. Consequently, two departmental complaints were made regarding the incident on the same date, one by Shri Chaman Lal himself to the Regional Manager, Transport (West) and the other by Shri Ram Kishan, ATI who was sitting with Shri Chaman Lal when the respondent allegedly barged into his office, to the Depot Manager. Accordingly, a chargesheet was issued to the respondent on the date of the incident itself, wherein he was asked to explain his alleged misconduct of assaulting his superior officer.

3. The respondent submitted a reply dated 22^nd September, 1992 to the chargesheet denying his very presence in Hari Nagar Depot II on the date of the incident. In his aforesaid reply, the respondent stated that from 2nd September, 1992 to 8^th September, 1992, he was undergoing treatment at R.M.L. Hospital and, in fact, on the date of incident, he was hospitalised in Popli Nursing Home. He further stated that the entire case against him was false and fabricated and was the outcome of the prejudice of the ATS against him, who was discontented with the respondent for not giving him ghee free of charge, which according to the respondent was being demanded by the ATS through the aforesaid Shri Ram Kishan, ATI.

4. In view of the denial of the incident by the respondent, a departmental inquiry was initiated against him in which Shri Chaman Lal and Shri Ram Kishan were examined as the only two prosecution witnesses. In the inquiry, the respondent besides reiterating the same plea that he was hospitalized on the date of the incident, produced a discharge certificate and the medical bills issued by Popli Nursing Home, evidencing his hospitalization from 3rd September, 1992 to 4th September, 1992. It also emerges that the respondent wanted to examine the concerned doctor from Popli Nursing Home as his defence witness and, therefore, on 13th November, 1992 made a request in this regard to the Inquiry Officer for producing Dr. P.S. Popli. The Inquiry Officer granted permission to the respondent to examine the doctor and adjourned the matter to 20th November, 1992 for the said purpose. However, on 20th November, 1992, the respondent was unable to produce the doctor and informed the Inquiry Officer that the doctor would not appear in the inquiry without a letter from the petitioner, calling upon him to appear before the Inquiry Officer. Accordingly, the Inquiry Officer sent a letter requiring Dr. Popli to appear before him on 30th November, 1992.

5. It transpires that on 30th November, 1992, Dr. Popli did not appear before the Inquiry Officer, but sent a letter stating that the respondent had been duly admitted in Popli Nursing Home on 3rd September, 1992 vide Indoor Registration No.113 for acute gastroenteritis, whereafter he was discharged at 6.00 p.m. on the following day. Dr. Popli also informed the Inquiry Officer that since he has to attend to his clinic in Najafgarh every day, he would not be able to appear in person, but could be contacted on the telephone in case any further information was needed. Upon receipt of this letter, the Inquiry Officer informed the respondent that Dr. Popli would not be able to appear and in case he wanted to examine any other witness, he would be free to do so. The respondent declined to produce any other defence witness and the matter was adjourned for the written submissions of both the parties. The Inquiry Officer then gave his report on 8th January, 1993, holding that the charge against the respondent was duly proved.

6. Based on the inquiry report, the order removing the respondent from service was passed by the petitioner on 13th May, 1994. Subsequently, upon a reference made by the competent authority, the matter was considered by the learned Labour Court in ID No. 208/08/96 and vide order dated 4th February, 1998, two preliminary issues were framed, one of them being whether the inquiry conducted against the respondent was fair, valid and proper. Thereafter, vide order dated 21st August, 2009, the learned Labour Court decided the issue of the validity of the inquiry proceedings in favour of the respondent by holding that when Dr. Popli was unable to appear on 30th November, 1992, the Inquiry Officer was expected to send a request letter to the said witness or direct the respondent to keep him present at the respondent’s own cost. Thus, the Court held that there was a serious lapse on the part of the Inquiry Officer in not summoning Dr. Popli as a defence witness by following the aforesaid procedure, thereby prejudicing the case of the respondent/workman and rendering the findings of the inquiry perverse.

7. The petitioner/Corporation was then given an opportunity to lead its evidence before the learned Labour Court, at which stage the petitioner examined only Shri Ram Kishan, who not only filed his affidavit of evidence but was also cross-examined by the authorised representative of the respondent. While considering the evidence of Shri Ram Kishan, the sole witness examined before it, the Court came to a conclusion that his cross-examination completely demolished his evidence-in-chief and, therefore, there was no material at all to hold that the charges against the respondent were proved. Since the respondent had already attained the age of 61 years by the time the Award was passed on 1st July, 2010, the learned Labour Court instead of directing any reinstatement, granted him a lump sum compensation of Rs. 2,00,000 towards back wages and held that he was entitled to gratuity for the entire period of service till the age of retirement as also to pension, if he had so opted. The Court also directed that the compensation amount along with gratuity be paid within thirty days after the publication of the Award, failing which the petitioner was directed to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum from the date of the Award till the realization of the total awarded amount by the respondent. It may be noted that since the respondent had not opted for pension, the only amount he was entitled to under the Award was the lump sum compensation of Rs.

2,00,000 and gratuity.

 

8. In the backdrop of the aforementioned facts, I may now refer to the submissions urged on behalf of the petitioner through its counsel, Mr. Uday N. Tiwary. First and foremost, Mr. Tiwary submits that the order dated 21st August, 2009 passed by the learned Labour Court on the issue of the validity of the departmental inquiry, is based on an erroneous premise that it was the duty of the Inquiry Officer to ensure the presence of the respondent’s defence witness. On the contrary, by placing reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd. v. Workmen, AIR 1965 SC 155, he submits that it is for the delinquent employee to produce his/her witnesses in a domestic inquiry conducted by the management. He further states that in the present case, even though there was no onus at all on the Inquiry Officer to summon the doctor as a defence witness, he had still taken the pains to summon Dr. Popli by writing a letter to him at the request of the respondent. However, when the doctor himself showed his reluctance to appear in the inquiry proceedings, the Inquiry Officer could not be faulted for concluding the inquiry after granting a further opportunity to the respondent to produce any other defence witnesses he desired, which opportunity the respondent did not avail.

 

9. Mr. Tiwary further submits that, while holding the issue regarding the validity of the inquiry against the petitioner, the Labour Court had categorically observed that there was no violation of the principles of natural justice except the lapse in not calling the respondent’s defence witness, which finding of prejudice is itself wholly without any basis as it was for the respondent to produce him in the inquiry proceedings. Therefore, once the inquiry had been held in accordance with the principles of natural justice as found by the learned Labour Court itself, there was no reason at all to interfere with the order of removal passed by the petitioner. It follows that the order dated 21st August, 2009, holding the issue of the validity of the domestic inquiry against the petitioner, is contrary to law and the facts emerging from the record. Mr. Tiwary’s contention, thus, is that there was no reason as to why the findings of the Inquiry Officer holding the respondent guilty of the charges levelled against him, ought not to be accepted, especially in a case like the present where the respondent had indulged in serious misconduct by assaulting his superior officer.

 

10. Finally, Mr. Tiwari contends that the learned Labour Court has misread the evidence of Shri Ram Kishan and has, in fact, come to an erroneous conclusion that the entire case of the management was demolished by the cross-examination of the said witness. The findings of the learned Labour Court that there was no material to pin-point the charges against the respondent, is wholly perverse as the very written complaint made by Shri Chaman Lal on 4th September, 1992 to the Depot Manager, clearly shows that the respondent had physically assaulted his superior officer and he was, therefore, rightly removed from service.

 

11. On the other hand, Mr. Anil Mittal, learned counsel appearing for the respondent while praying that the writ petition be dismissed, contends that the learned Labour Court had rightly found that there was a serious lapse on the part of the Inquiry Officer which vitiated the domestic inquiry. He states that in the present case, the very approach of the Inquiry Officer was faulty and he had acted in a most mechanical manner without making any real effort to arrive at a correct finding as to the guilt of the respondent qua the charges levelled against him. By placing reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Uttaranchal v. Kharak Singh, (2008) 8 SCC 236], he submits that it is incumbent upon the Inquiry Officer to conduct the inquiry proceedings in a bona fide manner without reducing the same to an empty formality. However, contrary to the binding legal mandate, the Inquiry Officer failed to act as an impartial officer and ignored a very vital piece of evidence in favour of the respondent, i.e., the letter sent by Dr. Popli himself when he was unable to appear before the Inquiry Officer in person for his examination on 30th November, 1992.

12. Taking his aforesaid plea further, Mr. Mittal contends that it has to be kept in mind that the respondent was a mere conductor who had made every effort to produce the doctor from the nursing home where he was hospitalised. When the doctor himself had sent a specific letter to the Inquiry Officer, giving all the necessary particulars, including the registration number vide which the respondent had been admitted in Popli Nursing home alongwith his telephone number on which he could be contacted, there was absolutely no justification as to why the Inquiry Officer did not contact the doctor, if needed, so as to verify the authenticity of the letter sent by him as also the authenticity of the medical documents produced by the respondent. He also relies on the Instructions dated 13th October, 1965 issued by the Delhi Transport Undertaking in relation to holding of inquiries and states that as per Clause 5 thereof, there is a procedure available for recording the evidence of passenger witnesses at their residence, which ought to have been adopted for recording Dr. Popli’s evidence in the peculiar circumstances of the present case also. Mr. Mittal’s contention, thus, is that the learned Labour Court has rightly come to the conclusion that there was a failure on the part of the Inquiry Officer in not giving another opportunity to the respondent to make his own arrangements for producing Dr. Popli as a defence witness, which in turn had prejudiced the case of the respondent and rendered the findings of the domestic inquiry perverse.

13. Mr. Mittal further contends that once the learned Labour Court had come to a categorical conclusion that the findings of the inquiry were perverse, there was no question of considering the evidence led in the inquiry to determine as to whether the respondent was guilty of the charges against him or not. In this regard, he relies on the decision of the Supreme Court in Neeta Kaplish v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court and Anr., (1999) 1 SCC 517, wherein it was held that while exercising its powers under Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 to set aside an order of discharge or dismissal issued against a workman, a Labour Court cannot rely on the record pertaining to the domestic enquiry when it has already found such proceedings to be defective. Therefore, in the present case, the learned Labour Court was absolutely justified in permitting the Management to lead fresh evidence viz-a-viz their stand that the respondent was guilty of assaulting his superior officer. While availing the opportunity granted to them to adduce fresh evidence, the petitioner examined only one witness, Shri Ram Kishan who categorically stated that no quarrel took place between the respondent and Shri Chaman Lal in his presence. Thus, in these circumstances, the learned Labour Court was fully justified in concluding that even on the basis of fresh evidence, there was no material on record at all to hold the respondent guilty of the charges levelled against him.

14. Without prejudice to his aforesaid contentions, Mr. Mittal finally submits that in view of the settled legal position in various decisions of the Supreme Court, laying down the parameters for interfering with the findings of subordinate courts by the High Courts, no case is made out for interfering with the Award passed by the learned Labour Court. He draws my attention specifically to paragraph 49 of the decision in Shalini Shyam Shetty & Anr. v. Rajendra Shankar Patil, (2010) 8 SCC 329, wherein the Supreme Court summarized the legal position on the legitimate exercise of the High Courts’ writ jurisdiction and power of superintendence under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution respectively.
15. In the light of the elaborate submissions made by the learned counsel for the parties, only two issues arise for my consideration, the first being whether the learned Labour Court was justified in passing the order dated 21st August, 2009, holding that the findings of the domestic inquiry were perverse. While the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that in the facts of the present case, it was the duty of the delinquent employee to produce his defence witnesses, learned counsel for the respondent has urged that the very purpose of a domestic inquiry is to find out the true factual matrix and, therefore, the Inquiry Officer ought to have made a real effort to contact Dr. Popli, especially when the said witness had specifically provided his telephone number to enable the officer to ascertain the authenticity of the medical documents produced by the respondent.

16. While examining the aforesaid issue, reference may be made to the decision relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner in Tata Oil (supra), wherein while dealing with a challenge to a domestic inquiry on the ground that the concerned inquiry officer did not take steps to get the defence witnesses brought before him, the Supreme Court held that:

            “5. … In a domestic enquiry, the officer holding the enquiry can take no valid or effective steps to compel the attendance of any witness… It would be unreasonable to suggest that in a domestic enquiry, it is the right of the charge-sheeted employee to ask for as many adjournments as he likes. It is true that if it appears that by refusing to adjourn the hearing at the instance of the charge-sheeted workman the Enquiry Officer failed to give the said workman a reasonable opportunity to lead evidence that may in a proper case be considered to introduce an element of infirmity in the enquiry; but in the circumstances of this case we do not think it would be possible to draw such an inference. The record shows that the Enquiry Officer went out of his way to assist [the workman]; and if the witnesses did not turn up to give evidence in time it was not his fault. We must accordingly hold that the Tribunal was in error in coming to the conclusion that the enquiry suffered from the infirmity that it was conducted contrary to the principles of natural justice.”

17. Thus, the Supreme Court has categorically held in Tata Oil (supra) that a domestic inquiry cannot be said to be in violation of the principles of natural justice merely because the inquiry officer did not take any steps to bring the defence witnesses before him. It must be borne in mind that an inquiry officer in a domestic inquiry is usually a member of the employer’s management who, in addition to his own professional assignments as a member of the organization/corporation in question, is entrusted with the task of fairly investigating the charges levelled against an employee. To hold that it is the inquiry officer’s duty to ensure the presence of the defence witnesses, would cast an unreasonable burden on such an officer and protract the inquiry proceedings, which opportunity may be exploited by the delinquent employee to his advantage. However, while the onus to produce the defence witnesses lies on the employee/workman, it is incumbent upon the inquiry officer to afford an adequate opportunity to such an employee/workman to ensure the presence of his defence witnesses, failing which the findings of an inquiry may be called into question on the ground of prejudice to the accused in meeting the case sought to be established against him.

18. I am, therefore, unable to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent that it was for the Inquiry Officer to ensure the presence of Dr. Popli and then record his statement, even though he was a defence witness. Merely because there is a procedure prescribed in the petitioner/Corporation’s Instructions dated 13th October, 1965 for examining passenger witnesses at their residence, it cannot be said that in every inquiry it is for the Inquiry Officer to go to the residences of the defence witnesses to record their evidence. The circular on a plain reading is not at all applicable to Dr. Popli, who was not a passenger witness but the respondent’s treating doctor during the period of his hospitalization on the date of the alleged incident. Even otherwise, the petitioner’s aforesaid contention overlooks the fact that the Instructions in question are only part of a departmental circular which, as per the decision of this Court in D.T.C. v. Om Dutt, (2015) IV LLJ 142 (Del), has no binding value as it merely stipulates rules of prudence that do not vitiate the inquiry proceedings if not complied with.

19. In the present case, even though it was incumbent on the respondent/workman to ensure the presence of his defence witness, the Inquiry Officer not only adjourned the domestic enquiry on one occasion in order to enable the respondent to produce Dr. Popli, but personally sent a letter to him requesting him to appear in the inquiry proceedings when he did not so appear on the adjourned date. Moreover, when Dr. Popli finally did not appear in person, the Inquiry Officer granted another opportunity to the respondent to examine any other defence witnesses he desired. Thus, in view of these admitted facts, it cannot be said that the Inquiry Officer did not grant an adequate opportunity to the respondent to produce Dr. Popli or any other person as his defence witness.

20. However, the matter does not end here. Even though I see no infirmity in the conduct of the Inquiry Officer in not making any further effort to ensure the presence of the respondent’s defence witness, what I find disturbing is that the Inquiry Officer who performs a quasi-judicial function and must arrive at a reasoned finding qua the delinquent employee’s guilt, has simply disregarded the medical documents produced by the respondent in support of his contention that he was hospitalized on the date of the alleged incident. In fact, once there was nothing to show that the medical documents produced by the respondent/workman were forged or fabricated, the Inquiry Officer ought to have at least considered the same before discounting them, by giving reasons howsoever brief they may be, particularly when the author of the medical documents himself had sent a letter confirming the authenticity of the said documents. Merely because the concerned doctor had not participated in the inquiry proceedings, the Inquiry Officer could not have in such a casual and mechanical manner, treated the respondent’s medical documents as having no weight and that too without ascribing any reasons. Thus, even though I am unable to persuade myself to agree with the view taken by the learned Labour Court that it was incumbent upon the Inquiry Officer to ensure the presence of the defence witness at the domestic inquiry, I am still of the view that the findings of the said inquiry are perverse due to the violation of the principles of natural justice on account of the unreasoned non-consideration of the respondent’s medical documents. Consequently, the order dated 21st August, 2009 holding the issue of the validity of the domestic inquiry against the petitioner, deserves to be upheld.

 

21. In view of my aforesaid conclusion, I may now deal with the second submission made by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the domestic inquiry having been conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice, no ground is made out for interfering with the findings thereof. Insofar as this contention is concerned, the parties are ad idem on the settled legal position that the record of a domestic inquiry that is held to be perverse, cannot be considered by a labour court or tribunal while exercising its powers under Section 11A of the Industrial Tribunals Act, 1947 to determine whether an order of discharge/dismissal is justified. Reference may be made to the decision of the Supreme Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the respondent in Neeta Kaplish (supra), the relevant paragraphs of which are reproduced hereinbelow for the sake of ready reference:

 

            “24. [T]he legal position as emerges out is that in all cases where enquiry has not been held or the enquiry has been found to be defective, the Tribunal can call upon the management or the employer to justify the action taken against the workman and to show by fresh evidence that the termination or dismissal order was proper. If the management does not lead any evidence by availing of this opportunity, it cannot raise any grouse at any subsequent stage that it should have been given that opportunity, as the Tribunal, in those circumstances, would be justified in passing an award in favour of the workman. If, however, the opportunity is availed of and the evidence is adduced by the management, the validity of the action taken by it has to be scrutinized and adjudicated upon on the basis of such fresh evidence.

* * *

 

27. The record pertaining to the domestic enquiry would not constitute “fresh evidence” as those proceedings have already been found by the Labour Court to be defective. Such record would also not constitute “material on record”, as contended by the counsel for the respondent, within the meaning of Section 11-A as the enquiry proceedings on being found to be bad, have to be ignored altogether. The proceedings of the domestic enquiry could be, and were in fact, relied upon by the Management for the limited purpose of showing at the preliminary stage that the action taken against the appellant was just and proper and that a full opportunity of hearing was given to her in consonance with the principles of natural justice. This contention has not been accepted by the Labour Court and the enquiry has been held to be bad. In view of the nature of objections raised by the appellant, the record of enquiry held by the Management ceased to be “material on record” within the meaning of Section 11-A of the Act and the only course open to the Management was to justify its action by leading fresh evidence as required by the Labour Court. If such evidence has not been led, the Management has to suffer the consequences.”

 

22. Once the findings of the Inquiry Officer are found to be perverse, although for entirely different reasons than those recorded in the impugned Award, the evidence produced in such proceedings cannot be taken into consideration while coming to a decision regarding the justifiability of the order of removal issued qua the respondent. It needs no gainsaying that once the issue of the validity of the domestic inquiry is held against the petitioner/management, the evidence led by the petitioner in the domestic inquiry stands wiped out and it is only the fresh evidence led before the learned Labour Court which can be considered to arrive at a conclusion regarding the culpability of the respondent in respect of the allegations against him. Neither the findings of the Inquiry Officer nor the evidence led before him are material to determine whether the respondent was guilty of the alleged misconduct.

 

23. This leads me to the only other issue raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner that, even on the basis of the fresh evidence led before the learned Labour Court, the charges against the respondent have been duly proved and, therefore, he was rightly dismissed from service. Before examining whether the petitioner has been able to make out a case for dismissing the respondent from service on the basis of the fresh evidence adduced before the learned Labour Court, it may be appropriate to refer to the relevant portions of Shri Ram Kishan’s cross-examination, which read as under:

 

            “…I have not written any report in my own hand writing to the management. However there is a typed letter dated 04.09.92 which is signed by me. I do not remember how many papers were there in the typed report. I have not given any statement to the management or SE Magistrate regarding any quarrel.

 

            I know Chaman Lal who was my officer. I have not given any statement alongwith Chaman to the SEM or before the management. No medical was test was undergone by Chaman Lal in my presence. There was no quarrel between Raj Singh and Chaman Lal in my presence…”

 

24. It may also be useful to refer to the observations of the learned Labour Court in respect of the evidence tendered by Shri Ram Kishan/MW 2. For the sake of ready reference, the relevant paragraphs 8 to 10 of the impugned order are extracted hereinbelow:

 

            “8. To prove this charge Ram Kishan filed his affidavit at Ex. MW 2/A. It is deposed by him that he was sitting with Chaman Lal ATS around 11.15 or 11.20. Workman came there and asked Chaman Lal to give him the duties inside as per seniority. MW-2 objected that the workman would not be able to work in the schedule section. Chaman Lal told MW-2 that the workman be given duty inside. Then the workman pushed Ram Kishan inside and told him “I want to talk to chaman Lal. Hardly, I had come few steps, he bolted the door inside. I heard Sh. Chaman Lal crying for help, I pushed the door hard and door bold from inside opened. Soon Raj Singh came out and went away’’. According to MW-2, later Duty Officer and Depot Manager came to the spot. He relied on already produced documents Ex. MW ID No. 208/08/96 4/6 1/ 1 to MW 1/ 5.

 

9. This witness was cross examined by the workman. MW-2 admitted that he is not well conversant with english. Further he admits that he can not say as to what is written in the affidavit. He further admits that affidavit was not prepared in his presence. He further admits that he has not written any report in his handwriting. He admits Chaman Lal was his officer. Further admits that there was quarrel between Raj Singh and Chaman Lal in his presence.

 

10. The cross examination of the management witness MW- 2 has completely demolished the say of the witness in chief. Therefore there is no material to pin point the workman towards the charges as having been proved. Therefore the order of the removal from service is held as unjustified in the circumstances.”

 

25. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that the aforesaid conclusion of the learned Labour Court is wholly perverse as it ignores the fact that Shri Ram Kishan had clearly stated that he had signed the typed letter dated 4th September, 1992 in which he had brought the entire incident to the notice of the Depot Manager immediately after it had taken place. He has urged that this is sufficient evidence to prove that the respondent was guilty of assaulting his superior officer and merely because the said witness had stated that he did not remember how many papers were there in the typed copy of the complaint or that he had not given any statement to the management regarding any quarrel, it could not be held that the said witness had demolished his examination-inchief.

 

26. Having examined the entire statement of Shri Ram Kishan in his cross-examination, I am unable to persuade myself that the view taken by the learned Labour Court is in any manner perverse or leads to a failure of justice. Merely because another view more favourable to the petitioner may be possible on the aforesaid witness’ cross-examination, as is vehemently contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner, would not be a reason for this Court to interfere with the findings of the learned Labour Court in exercise of its powers under Articles 226 or 227 of the Constitution. The writ jurisdiction and powers of superintendence of this Court have to be exercised only sparingly to ensure that the subordinate courts do not exceed their own jurisdiction and exercise it as and when required, or when there has been a manifest failure of justice, or when the principles of natural justice have been flouted. In my opinion, no such eventuality has occurred in the present case so as to warrant the exercise of the powers of this Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. On the other hand, I cannot lose sight of the fact that the respondent who had rendered seventeen years of service with the petitioner/Corporation, is now already 70 years old and under the impugned Award, he would be entitled to receive only Rs. 2,00,000 as lump sum compensation besides gratuity for his wrongful removal from service, as he had admittedly not opted for pension.

 

27. For the aforesaid reasons, the impugned order dated 21st August, 2009 as also the impugned Award dated 1st July, 2010 are upheld. The petition being meritless, is dismissed with no order as to costs.